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logical underpinnings of the founding.6 In law, Frank Michelman,7 Cass Sunstein,8 and Suzanna Sherry9 reacted against the classical liberalism-the libertarianism-that others found in the Constitution and held up as a standard for constitutional and legal interpretation.10 In political theory, and philosophy, Michael Sandel reacted against the Kantian liberalism of Rawls.1" Philip Pettit reacted against the identification of political freedom with negative liberty.
12
In philosophy, law, and political theory, thinkers engaged in the revival attempted to frame republican legal and political theories appropriate for contemporary societies like the United States. These theories were to preserve liberal advances over classical republicanism, like liberal commitments to human rights and political inclusiveness, while avoiding the inadequacies of the liberal theories they were meant to supplant. This required supplementing classical republicanism to address concerns-like the concern for personal autonomy-that sparked the development of the liberal tradition but were peripheral to the republican one. To answer the objection that republicanism is a form of ethical life which is unavailable under modern conditions,13 it required imagining institutional forms through which republican government can now be exercised. Most important for present purposes, the revival of 
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republicanism required abandoning elements found in classical republican writers because they were at odds with what seemed to be liberal insights. It is because of their self-conscious commitment to framing a reconstructed republicanism that these authors are often referred to as neo-republicans.
Any neo-republican theory-whether political or perfectionist-must satisfy three conditions. First, it must be intellectually satisfactory. It must give intellectually satisfying accounts of the core notions of political theory, including the notions of citizenship, freedom and the public good. It must also offer plausible answers to problems like "How do we know when a given political outcome promotes or is consistent with the public good?" and "Under what conditions is the state's exercise of power legitimate?" Second, it must be politically adequate. It must be capable of serving as a selfsustaining public philosophy for a pluralistic democracy. This requires that it be capable of informing the habits of thought and conduct that enable citizens and public officials to sustain the political practices the theory identifies as republican, and to realize freedom and the public good as neo-republicans conceive them. Third, if the theory is to be called "neo-republican," it must be historically responsible. It must have sufficient affinities to the republican tradition of political thought running from Cicero to Madison that it is plausible to locate the theory within it.
The last condition, while hardly vacuous, is rather loose. Neorepublicans typically draw upon historical materials that belong to the earlier republican tradition. Those materials were written in a variety of circumstances, often by political actors who were responding to the quite different political dangers each perceived as most salient in his own time. Some worked under the threat of despotism, others under the threat of imperial designs like those of Julius Caesar, still others under the shadow of political domination by a ruling family like the Medici or a regional power like the Papal States. Thinkers in the tradition accordingly gave emphasis to the republican ideas that seemed the most effective political and intellectual responses to the threats they faced. The result is a set of texts which show strong enough family resemblances and lines of descent to distinguish them from other traditions of political thought, but which are sufficiently different in tone, emphasis and guiding ideas that they could never be mistaken for clones.
Faced with these diverse materials, neo-republican theorists abstract and systematize their leading ideas in different ways and establish different orders of intellectual priority. Frank Michelman turns to the republican tradition to solve a persistent puzzle about citizen sovereignty. John Pocock, by contrast, suggests that the location of sovereignty was a problem of at most secondary concern to the republican thinkers about whom he writes.14 Philip Pettit makes freedom, understood as nondomination, the "supreme political value" of his neo-republican theory.15 Michael Sandel, Cass Sunstein, and Frank Michelman endorse a form of neo-republicanism that accords pride of place to self-government-something Pettit thinks has only instrumental value because it promotes his preferred form of freedom.16 Both sorts of neo-republicanism are, I believe, historically responsible. Here I shall be concerned with the immensely influential neo-republicanisms that are centrally committed to self-government and with the perfectionist and political forms this republicanism can assume.17
14. See Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, p. 316: "Humanist political thought excelled at this sort of analysis, and subordinated the consideration of power to it; liberty, virtue and corruption, rather than the location of authority, were its prime concerns." 15. Pettit, Republicanism, p. 8. 16. Ibid. 17. Pettit's neo-republicanism is also extremely interesting and worthy of critical examination in its own right. Here I simply want to point out that the republican tradition is more complex, and his appropriation of it more selective, than his historiography occasionally suggests. As I noted, Pettit takes freedom as nondomination by others as the "supreme political value" of his theory. The achievement of this sort of political freedom is so valuable, Pettit thinks, because it brings the independent social status that Pettit says was the mark of citizenship in the republican tradition. There is ample support in Pocock's historical work for the claim that Italian and English republicans valued such independence and thought it a short step from dependence to corruption. On the other hand, I am not aware of anything in Cicero's writings that suggests he noticed the tension between his embrace of republicanism and the Roman institution of patronage and clientage, under which some citizens were very much dependent upon others. For the importance of clientage in Cicero's Rome, see Erich S. Gruen, The Last Generation of the Roman Republic (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), pp. 435, 446; on pp. viii-ix, Gruen stresses that clients' dependence on their patrons was social as well as political. Furthermore, republican citizenship was not always valued because of the social or political status it conferred. Sometimes it was sought for the access it brought to economic benefits. See A.N. Sherwin-White, The Roman Citizenship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980 ), p. 135. Pettit argues that making freedom as he understands it the central political value of his neo-republicanism fits with the contrast between freedom and slavery that is so prominent a feature of republican writing. This is because slaves' lack of freedom, Pettit thinks, consists precisely in the fact that they are legally and socially dominated even by masters who let them do what they like. But this seizes on one feature of the slave's status at the expense of others that are arguably of equal importance. To mention two others, slaves are not typically consulted about the ends or organization of the enterprises in which they are employed, and they are typically exploited in the 292 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ II Neo-republicans who give self-government a central place in their theories typically think that citizens should govern themselves by public deliberation. That is, they think citizens should decide issues and choose representatives after processes in which they deliberate-in which they offer one another reasons or arguments, rather than threats or bargains. Participants in these processes should be free and equal. Deliberations should be inclusive, so that citizens can participate regardless of point of view or group membership. The reasons they offer one another should be public-regarding, rather than self-regarding. They should be proposals to advance the good of the public rather than that of an individual, section or faction.
If neo-republican theories are to be politically adequate, they must identify conditions necessary for citizens to advance the public good through well-conducted deliberation, and for them to maintain the practices of deliberation over time so that they govern themselves well in the long run.'8 They must also say something about how those conditions are to be satisfied in the societies to which they are addressed, societies like the contemporary United States. What are those conditions? For many writers in the classical republican tradition, the conditions of effective, sustainable self-government prominently included moral conditions. Republican government that attains the public good, they thought, requires a virtuous citizenry. The concepts they used to describe the virtues and their opposites were crude sense that those enterprises are not reciprocally beneficial. Their efforts are expended for the benefit of others in non-consensual arrangements. We can imagine republican theories which made much of the opposition between slavery and freedom, but which seized on these other features of slavery instead. Thus in some moods Cicero made much of the importance of consultation. The contrast Aquinas drew between the rule over slaves and political rule turned on the fact that slaves are used for another's benefit; see Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae 1.96.4. A Thomist republicanism could take this distinction as its point of departure; perhaps Jacques Maritain held such a view. 
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THE REVIEW OF POLITICS PERFECTIONIST REPUBLICANISM 293 thick ethical concepts: fortitude, rectitude, integrity, dependence, servility, corruption. At least some writers in the tradition stressed that the civic virtues were genuine human excellences because contributing to the public good is part of the human good.19 The virtues required by republican government were therefore thought to be virtues in the strong sense. Finally, the virtues required for selfgovernment were thought to be very demanding. Indeed they were thought so demanding that they could not be developed and sustained simply by engaging in the practices of politics in which they were exercised. They required significant extra-political support. This support was to take the forms of prevalent ways of life like yeomanry or soldiering,20 and prevalent religious or quasi-religious beliefs, deemed conducive to the civic virtues.21
In sum, parts of the classical republican tradition, at least, offered highly moralized theories of politics. This is true of the republicanism of the American founders.22 It is equally true of that part of the republican tradition that arguably influenced the American Founders most profoundly, the Roman republicanism of Cicero 
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views of human excellence. The civic virtues on which they dwell are not the cardinal virtues that were traditionally opposed to dependency and personal corruption. Instead they are the traits citizens need to talk with one another as equals in the public fora of a contemporary pluralistic society. These neo-republicans stress that citizens must be willing to participate in politics,24 that they must offer public-regarding justifications for the policies they favor,25 that they should attempt to understand points of view different from their own,26 that they should be prepared to "reconsider [their] ends and commitments."27 Furthermore, in calling these virtues civic virtues, these neo-republicans are making a claim about their value. That claim is the weaker of the two I distinguished at the outset. Civic virtues are valuable traits of character because they make their possessors good citizens, equipping them to contribute to the public good understood as the outcome of well-conducted public deliberation. There is not said to be any further connection with genuine human excellence. As Cass Sunstein says of his own view: Accepting this line of thought, some contemporary republicans also refuse to build their political theories on theories of the human good. They therefore distance themselves from what Sunstein calls the "classical formulation" of the civic virtues-and the classical listin order to satisfy the political adequacy requirement. These are the thinkers I refer to as "political republicans." I want to query whether this attempt to meet the political adequacy requirement undermines the political republican's ability to satisfy it. I suggest that emphasis on the deliberative virtues leads to the not so salutary neglect of a civic virtue that was more prominently discussed earlier in the republican tradition, at times when political theory could be more overtly moralized without failing to be politically adequate. I also suggest that the political republican account of why that virtue would be valuable leaves citizens too weak an incentive to develop and act on it. When citizens of a pluralistic society like ours regard the virtue as a virtue simply because of its connection to effective self-government, they may not have the motivation they need to be civically virtuous. To ask whether this is so I shall focus, not on one of the obviously deliberative virtues, but on the cardinal virtue of temperance. Before doing so, however, let me comment on my application of the label "political republican" to those who rely on a weak view of the civic virtues.
III
The term "political republicanism" is, of course, reminiscent of John Rawls's term "political liberalism." Rawls famously distinguishes political from comprehensive liberalism by three conditions. According to the first, the central focus of a political conception of justice is society's basic institutions, the norms that apply to them and the ways "those norms are to be expressed in [citizens'] character and attitudes." These ways of expressing the norms include the virtues citizens must normally have if they are to do their part in the maintenance of just institutions. According to the second condition, political conceptions can be presented independent of comprehensive doctrines. They therefore account for the value of the civic virtues without appealing to claims about human flourishing or about what makes human life worth living. According to the third condition, political conceptions are worked out from fundamental ideas seen as implicit in the public political culture of constitutional regimes.
Nothing in Rawls's statement of the three conditions implies that the distinction between political and comprehensive conceptions can only be drawn among liberal conceptions, as Rawls would readily acknowledge.29 It should therefore be possible to develop political versions of neo-republicanism or, what I call "political republicanisms." Political republicanisms are republican theories that satisfy Rawls's three conditions. Like political liberalisms they are restricted in scope and are capable of being presented independent of comprehensive doctrines. They include accounts of the civic virtues, but do not explain the value of the civic virtues by appeal to comprehensive doctrine. They are also worked up from fundamental ideas implicit in the public political culture of constitutional regimes like the United States and other north Atlantic democracies.
As I have stressed, the resurgence of republicanism in the last decade and a half has been the result of a self-conscious revival. It is the result of attempts to revive a strain of political thought that is a part, albeit a previously neglected part, of the political tradition of the United States, England, the Netherlands, and Italy. Much of the work of those contributing to the revival has been historical or has drawn on the work of historians to show that republicanism is part of that tradition. This work has been done to make claims for the justifiability of republicanism at least initially plausible. For if a revived republicanism is presented as based on ideas to be found in the North Atlantic tradition or on ideas present in the public culture of, say, the United States, citizens may be more easily persuaded that republicanism coheres with their considered judgments. At least, they will be more easily persuaded if the republicanism in question is a neo-republicanism which incorporates liberal commitments to rights. Thus contemporary proponents of republicanism have, in effect, tried to show that republicanism satisfies the third of the three conditions which define political conceptions.
The interest of the other two conditions on political conceptions-and the distinction between political and comprehensive republicanisms-has been more clearly recognized by some contemporary republicans than others. Because of Michael Sandel's early criticisms of Rawls, we might expect to find the distinction clearly drawn in his more recent defense of republicanism, though it seems to be there only implicitly.30 Suzanna Sherry seems to grasp 33. In an attempt to show that Rawls's distinction between political and comprehensive views is not clearly drawn, Dagger introduces a distinction between views which are "implicitly" and "explicitly comprehensive." Implicitly comprehensive views are those that rely on a conception of the nonpolitical good but do so implicitly rather than explicitly. Dagger then argues that Rawls's view, while ostensibly political must be implicitly comprehensive. It must, that is, rely implicitly on a conception of the nonpolitical good. The crucial step in Dagger's argument for this conclusion is the claim that justice as fairness is not neutral in its foreseen but unintended affects. For this line of argument, see Civic Virtues, pp. 188-91. I would argue that to make the distinction between political and comprehensive views dependent upon the difference between neutrality and nonneutrality of foreseen but unintended affects is mistaken, though I cannot pursue the matter here. and defended political republicanism. For if the distinction between political conceptions of justice and comprehensive doctrines is indeed significant, then it is surely interesting to learn which views in the history of political thought can plausibly be reformulated as political conceptions and which cannot. This is especially true of views such as republicanism, which had so profound an influence on the development of Western liberal democracies and which is presented as a rival to various forms of liberalism, including political liberalism. It would surely be interesting to learn whether those that cannot be reformulated plausibly cannot be because they fail to be intellectually satisfactory, politically adequate or because they fail some other condition. The study of political republicanism might also show that the distinction between political and comprehensive republicanisms, though tenable, is not the most illuminating distinction to draw between republican views or not the most illuminating to draw for some purposes. 34 But as I have already suggested, political republicanism is not a previously unidentified possibility. This possibility has been seen most clearly by Sunstein and Michelman, two thinkers whose remarks about the civic virtues suggest that they wish to account for the value of those virtues while eschewing comprehensive doctrine. They do not refer to their own views as "political republicanism," but they have most fully grasped the implications of Rawls's political turn for work in the republican tradition. Like other participants in the republican revival, they draw on historical work to show, in effect, that their republicanisms satisfy Rawls's third condition. They also recognize that questions about the civic virtues fall within the scope of their views, consistent with Rawls's statement of his first condition. But they recognize-at least implicitly-the importance of satisfying Rawls's second condition when they answer those questions. By satisfying the three conditions, they presumably hope to gain the advantages that Rawls thinks his own view enjoys over comprehensive liberalisms. They hope to frame views which are worked up from ideas which are familiar because present in the shared political culture of constitutional democracies. And they hope those views will be widely acceptable because they avoid the deeper controversies which divide the societies they address.
34. As Amy Gutmann seems to think that for purposes of justifying programs of democratic education, the distinction between political and comprehensive liberalisms is less important than the distinction between liberalisms which are "deeply partisan" and those which are not; see her "Civic Education and Social Diversity," Ethics 105 (1995): 575.
THE REVIEW OF POLITICS PERFECTIONIST REPUBLICANISM 299
The study of political republicanism may suggest what strengths and weaknesses to look for in other conceptions that are political and that share certain essential features with political republicanism, such as the emphasis on self-governance and the list of civic virtues deemed necessary for self-government. Deliberative democratic theories, for example, also emphasize self-government and, at least in some versions, claim that citizens must have certain deliberative virtues if they are to govern themselves. It is not surprising that Sunstein and Michelman are among the foremost proponents of deliberative democracy.35 Both move easily between republican and deliberative views. In one recent work, Sunstein suggests that for purposes of understanding American constitutionalism, there is not a significant difference between the two.36 Some deliberative democratic theories are also egalitarian,37 as I shall claim political republicanism is. I would argue that they therefore require citizens to have the civic virtue of temperance, as I shall claim political republicanism does. As we shall see, it is the conjunction of an important feature of temperance which I shall call "broad basedness" on the one hand, with political republicanism's commitments to self-government and egalitarianism on the other, that leaves it vulnerable to critique. This suggests that political versions of deliberative democracy may be similarly vulnerable.
Of course only a careful examination of deliberative democratic theories would settle the matter. The advantage of examining political republicanism is that views are most easily assessed in contrast with their rivals. In the case of political republicanism, there is a natural rival readily available for comparison. The history of the republican tradition itself provides that rival in the form of perfectionist republicanism. That history also shows that republicanism has traditionally been thought to require certain moral conditions. Teasing out why suggests criticisms that might be pressed against political versions of deliberative democracy.38 
IV
The achievement and maintenance of economic justice should be high on the agenda of any government. I assume that taxation and redistribution of income and wealth are among the means of achieving economic justice that have to be considered and sometimes implemented. I also assume that republicans are especially sympathetic to the egalitarian distribution of income and the dispersal of wealth. For inequalities of income and wealth may make some citizens financially dependent upon others. This, in turn, may compromise the political freedom and equality of the dependents. Moreover, republicans may fear that concentrations of wealth will concentrate political power because of the ability of the wealthy to exercise unequal influence. And so I assume republicans will insist that taxation, redistribution, restrictions on intergenerational transfers, and restrictions on the use of money in politics, all receive very serious consideration.
Clearly if citizens are to consider and, when necessary, implement such measures, they will have to be properly disposed to income, wealth and possessions. The elements of the relevant dispositions are quite complex, and they are likely to be quite demanding of those who are better off. Reaching and abiding by just outcomes may well require those citizens to be somewhat detached from material wealth and from the prestige that wealth confers. Giving serious consideration to egalitarian measures will require them to be ready to part with some of what they have and to refrain from rationalizing their possession of it in public deliberation. It will also require them to be reflective about the effects of their first order dispositions on their own capacities for judgment, hence to be self-effacing about the personal and political consequences of being unduly attached to material possessions. In sum, governance which is just by republican standards may well require citizens-especially the better off-to develop and exercise important forms of temperance.
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PERFECTIONIST REPUBLICANISM This is especially so if the government is to be republican government conducted by inclusive public deliberation. Some forms of liberalism are consistent with a relatively passive citizenry. They do not particularly value citizens' political participation. They do require that citizens be temperate enough to comply with just legislation but the sanctions which attend noncompliance provide strong incentives to obey. Republican government, however, is self-government. It requires temperate behavior for which citizens have no comparable incentives. Republican citizens are, for example, to cast public-rather than self-regarding votes for candidates. This implies that they must be ready to support candidates who, if elected, may ask them to make sacrifices so that others can have more. Citizens are also to take part in public deliberation about issues, offering public-regarding arguments for the policies they regard as just. This implies that they must be ready to argue for proposals which could impose significant costs on them. In neither of these cases is the readiness reinforced by the threat of legal sanction. Republican government thus requires an especially high degree of voluntary, noncoerced temperance. It requires, as classical republicans recognized, an especially virtuous (or perhaps an especially continent) citizenry.
Political republicans might well accept this point. Nothing they say is inconsistent with it. If convinced that temperance is necessary for adequate self-government, they might agree that it should be considered a civic virtue along with the more obviously deliberative qualities they explicitly mention. It is interesting that they have said little about temperance and that their list of civic virtues would have to be expanded to include it. As I mentioned earlier, I attribute this reticence to a reluctance to endorse the traditional theories of human flourishing that accorded temperance an important place. But I do not want to make too much of this suggestion. Instead I shall simply assume political republicans would acknowledge that republican government requires a temperate citizenry.
My own view is that some orientations toward wealth and consumption make us worse as people. Among the many ways in which they do so is by dulling us to the claims of the spiritual, broadly understood as including the intellectual, the aesthetic, and the religious, and by deafening us to the claims of others on our resources. Temperance is a corrective which orients us properly toward wealth and consumption. When properly developed, it is a human excellence. There is no way of determining what the 301 302 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS proper or temperate orientation toward these things is without principles of justice.39 There is at least that much truth to the claim that the virtues are unified. Because temperance must be informed by justice, it is a civic virtue-in the strong sense.
These views, the view that better people make better citizens and the attractions of self-government, all contribute to the appeal of some version of perfectionist republicanism. One such version would be a republicanism that is reconciled to big government as the most effective counterweight to concentrations of private economic power. Such a republicanism would also value self-government, thinking that an informed, public-spirited, and vigilant citizenry is necessary to forestall devolution into what de Tocqueville famously referred to as "soft despotism" by an increasingly powerful state.40 Like traditional republicanism, it would be 39. Indeed Thomas Aquinas, who calls the proper orientation toward these things "liberality," argues that that orientation is part of justice rather than temperance; see Summa Theologiae 11-11,117,5 ad 2. Some will think that Aquinas is correct. Temperance, they may think, cannot be a civic virtue for it seems to be a self-regarding virtue having to do with the proper regulation of one's own appetites for food, drink and sex. Note first, however, that even apparently self-regarding virtues can also be civic virtues, for actions that proceed from wary of political dependence, particularly the interdependence of governing and economic elites. It would also be perfectionist in that it would view the civic virtues required for self-government as genuine human excellences. I cannot develop and defend such a view here; indeed such a view may have serious problems of its own. To indicate its advantages over political republicanism, I want to examine the practical consequences of a political theory which claims that temperance is a civic virtue only in the weak sense. I want, that is, to query the practical consequences of claiming that it is a quality of character which is valuable because it is necessary for self-government while remaining silent about whether it is a genuine human excellence. I am inclined, however, to think that some version of broadbasedness is correct. As I have already suggested, the temperance needed for contributing to public deliberation about tax policy, say, and for adhering readily to its verdicts manifests a deeper orientation toward our income, wealth, and consumption. It may be consistent with a certain amount of self-indulgence. But there is truth to the remark that "where your treasure is, there also your heart shall be."41 Recast in more prosaic and political terms: too deep an attachment to our pocketbooks makes us too ready to vote them. Too strong an attraction to our money and the things it buys makes it too difficult for us to part with money when justice demands it. The orientation toward income, wealth, and consumption that is necessary for someone to perceive and act on the demands of justice, and sincerely to deliberate about what she may have to give up, needs reinforcement in private life. Even someone who accepts the "good enough" view of the civic virtues should recognize that.
I therefore think the political republican should grant that the civic virtue of temperance requires a family of affective, intellective, and appetitive dispositions which are exercised in activities seemingly unrelated to citizenship. Consistent with her theory, she can stick to her claim that, appearances of incongruity notwithstanding, the members of this family are valuable simply because they equip their possessors for self-government. The pressing question for the political republican is whether accounting for the value of temperance this way diminishes the likelihood that citizens will develop and act from it. It seems to me that it does, and that recognizing the truth of some form of broad-basedness makes the problem even more pressing.
Much of the time virtuous action takes place, if not automatically, at least with little reflection on our motives, on the deeper 41. Luke 12:34.
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dispositions to which those motives are connected, or on the value of the dispositions and attitudes that comprise the virtue. There are, however, occasions on which we do reflect about these matters. We may ask whether a virtue is worth acquiring or is worth training in a different direction, so that it motivates a new family of actions. Or we may ask whether the quality which the occasion seems to call on really is worth having or worth acting from. Some of these are occasions on which we are exhorted by others to be just or faithful or to show some self-restraint. Some are occasions on which we are tempted not to act from these virtues, or when we find it difficult to do so. We may then remind ourselves of the kind of persons we aspire to be and recall why we think certain qualities are worth acting from even under difficult circumstances. At times like these, what we believe about the value of the virtues matters.
If all that political republicans are prepared to say about the civic virtues is that they are valuable because they make their possessors good citizens, this will show itself in the public culture and government action of a political republican regime. The weak view of the civic virtues will inform public practices of criticism and encouragement, and individual reflection on action with political consequences. When young people are publicly educated in the right forms of temperance, they will be told that temperance is worth cultivating because it will make them good citizens. When political leaders exhort constituents to relinquish earnings because tax revenues are needed to fund government programs, they will say that it is characteristic of the good citizen to defer gratification for justice's sake. When citizens are tempted to do the intemperate thing, what the political republican counts on to check them is the knowledge that temperance is one of the virtues of a good citizen. Public morality in a political republican regime will therefore be morality which stops with the invocation of political values. Education, exhortation, self-examination, and self-restraint will be quite different in a perfectionist republican regime. There public morality, public education, and political oratory could trade on the claims that helping to govern one's society is part of a well-lived life and that the temperance required for doing so is a human excellence.
The tendencies to be countered by political republican education, exhortation, and self-restraint are obviously very powerful. If they are to be effective against these tendencies, people must care very greatly about living up to the demands of citizenship. This is clear once we appreciate the truth of broad-basedness. According to broad-basedness, the temperance required for republican citizenship is connected to dispositions which show themselves in many other areas of life. Developing and exercising the former re-quires developing and exercising the latter. If the only incentive political republicans can offer for developing the former is the importance of living up to the demands of citizenship, it is hard to see that they could offer any other incentive for the latter either. Our citizenship would therefore have to regulate large stretches of our lives, both public and private.
Some thinkers in the republican tradition thought that it could, at least with the right kind of education. American revolutionary Benjamin Rush famously gave extreme expression to this thought, saying that "[i]t is possible to convert men into republican machines." In the ideal republican education, Rush continued, the American would "be taught that he does not belong to himself, but that he is public property."42 No political republican, however, would endorse so illiberal a goal of civic education. Yet without an extremely heavy-handed educational program, it is not at all clear the members of contemporary democracies will value their citizenship highly enough or identify with it to a sufficient degree to spur development of the republican virtues. It is certainly not obvious that they care enough about being good citizens to let the demands of citizenship govern as much of their lives as they would have to if I am right about the broad-basedness of temperance. There is also some evidence-in the form of low rates of voter turnout and political participation and the low level of effort people expend on their own political education-that Americans do not attach great importance to doing what a good republican citizen would do.
This empirical point serves a deeper aim. For many people in large democratic republics, the identity of republican citizenship is reflectively escapable. Their felt need to participate in self-government is not urgent. Reflecting on their lives, their many social roles, and the demands on their time, they can distance themselves from the role of self-governing citizen or reject it entirely with relatively few perceptible costs. In this the identity of republican citizen differs significantly from that of moral agent. Moral agency is not reflectively inescapable. It is not logically impossible for someone to reject the view that she is a moral agent and to reject the claims that that identity makes upon her. Moral skepticism is a coherent position. But the costs of this rejection to someone's self-esteem, and to her abilities to deliberate and choose, are incomparably higher. This is because the categories and norms associated with our moral agency are much more deeply implicated in our practical 42. Cited at Wood, Creation, p. 427.
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